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SWEET REWARDS: How U.S. TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND
PENETRATION OF BRAZILIAN ETHANOL INTO THE U.S.
MARKET CAN STIMULATE AMERICA'S DOMESTIC
ECONOMY AND STRENGTHEN AMERICAS
INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE
Sean Charles Starr*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a 2000 speech at Hanoi National University, four months after
the signing of a free trade agreement between the United States and
Vietnam, Bill Clinton urged an audience of students not to worry
about "globalization . . . [and] its unsettling and unpredictable conse-
quences . . . [because] globalization is not something we can hold off
or turn off. It is the economic equivalent of a force of nature like
wind or water."' Today, amidst an unsettling and unpredictable back-
drop that includes the collapse of the July 2008 WTO Doha round of
negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland,2 the continuing global economic
crisis, a global food shortage, the election of Barack Obama and a
democratic majority in Congress, and the London and Toronto G20
meetings, America's role in global trade has become an increasingly
protectionist one.
Buoyed by the influx of illegal workers from Mexico, lead-painted
toys from China, and a lingering sense of xenophobia from 9/11 and
the Bush administration years, America's economic nationalism
* J.D. DePaul University School of Law, May 2010, M.A., English, University of Illinois at
Chicago, May 2004, B.A., English, University of Illinois at Chicago, May 2002.
1. Bill Clinton, President of the U.S., Address at Vietnam National University in Hanoi (Nov.
17, 2000) in 2000 WLNR 4676691.
2. The top U.S. trade official recently expressed doubt that the 2010 round will end with a
different result. While the Senate lingers over confirmation of some of Obama's key economic
appointees, the U.S. continues to hold to its position that trade tariffs will only be relaxed if
emerging market countries concede more access to their markets by U.S. interests. These factors
only continue to further cement overriding international opinion that an agreement at Doha will
only happen if the U.S. takes the first step and changes its stance. For a general overview of the
failed Doha talks, see http://www.reuters.com (search "wto@oundtoha+2010"); see, e.g., Surojit
Gupta, India Hopes WTO Talks Will Resume, But Is Unwavering, REUTERS, July 31, 2008.
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threatens its status in the international community.3 While other
countries aggressively align themselves with one another, increasing
their economic and subsequent geopolitical interdependence, Ameri-
can resistance to trade liberalization with South American countries,
particularly with Brazil, stymies a tangible opportunity for economic
development and the intangible potential for geopolitical influence.
As part of what public intellectual and well-known international law
attorney Laurent Cohen-Tanugi calls the "emerging world's revolu-
tion,"4 and what many others just call "BRIC," 5 Brazil, along with
China, India, Russia and others, has become a significant player in the
global economy. With its agricultural boom, developing biofuel indus-
try, and recent discovery of extensive oil and gas deposits under the
South Atlantic continental shelf off its coast, Brazil seems poised to
become the latest incarnation of the "economic equivalent of a force
of nature."6 Accordingly, now is the right moment for America to
foster a policy of engagement with Brazil through reductions in Amer-
ican farm subsidies and tariffs on Brazilian ethanol.
This Article proposes that by opening trade with Brazil, America
can improve its domestic economy and its international position, in-
stead of just standing in the way of something it cannot hold off or
turn off. Amidst the current economic recession and following on the
heels of the G-20 pact that promises to "name and shame" protection-
ist countries that erect international trade barriers,7 the time is right
for the U.S. to respond with an innovative model that combines do-
mestic economic reinvigoration and development of U.S. international
relations. This Article contends that by allowing Brazilian ethanol to
penetrate the U.S. market, without the constraints of unreasonably
prohibitive tariffs or inflated domestic subsidies, America can do just
that.
3. Nina Easton, America Sours on Free Trade, FORTUNE 500, Jan. 25, 2008, available at http://
money.cnn.com/2008/01/18/news/economy/worldgoaway.fortune/index.htm (discussing how eco-
nomic anxiety has inspired a backlash against free trade and questioning whether this will lead to
U.S. protectionism).
4. LAURENT COHEN-TANUGI, THE SHAPE OF THE WORLD TO COME: CHARTING THE GEOPOL-
ITICS OF A NEW CENTURY, at 12 (2007).
5. Jim O'Neill, chief financial analyst for Goldman Sachs originally coined the term in 2001
when he predicted that these three countries would pass the West's six largest economies in
terms in terms economic strength by 2041 (which later became 2039, and later 2032). For a
discussion by Jim O'Neill on the Bric countries see Jim O'Neill, We need Brics to build the world
economy: Before long Brazil, Russia, India, and China will be bigger than all the G7 countries
combined, TIMES, June 23, 2009.
6. Clinton, supra note 1.
7. Mark Lander & David E. Sanger, World Leaders Pledge $1.1 Trillion for Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/world/europe/
03summit.html?hp.
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Several factors currently in place allow for Brazilian ethanol pene-
tration into the U.S. market to demonstrably stimulate the American
economy. To begin with, the consistently stated American goal of
eliminating dependence on foreign oil coupled with the immense envi-
ronmental damage stemming from the 60,000 or more barrels of oil
spilling out of the BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill everyday", provides an
excellent policy backdrop to bring Brazilian ethanol to the forefront.
The current political and cultural enthusiasm for alternatives to the
unstable Middle East oil industry and domestic drilling provides both
the idealistic and practical motivational animus necessary for the type
of wide-scale change Brazilian market penetration would bring. Shift-
ing American dependence away from foreign oil and towards Brazil-
ian ethanol would have the effect of shifting emphasis away from
domestically produced corn-based ethanol. Rethinking the American
corn ethanol model and an increased market reliance on the Brazilian
sugarcane model would stimulate the American economy in three
needed ways: 1) increase domestic competition; 2) elevate consumer
confidence, and; 3) revitalize the American farm system. Further-
more, a strengthened reciprocal relationship with Brazil should in-
crease the opportunity for American businesses in terms of know-how
and potential investment in Brazilian oil excavation and development.
The last factor is the most nuanced and difficult to estimate because it
relies on the economy of geopolitical significance. This Article sug-
gests that international influence is critical for the future sustainability
of the American economy and that this influence, more than ever,
depends on new models of reliance and integration. By fostering a
further developed relationship with Brazil, the largest, wealthiest, and
most influential of South American countries, through the liberalized
trade of Brazilian ethanol, America can help stabilize the Western
Hemisphere's economy and its position within it as primary global
force.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Long Route to Sweet Success
Following its discovery by Portuguese explorer Pedro Cabral, Bra-
zil's sugar producing capacity radically changed the contours of its
agrarian society of indigenous peoples.9 Today, Brazil's societal con-
8. topics.nytimes.com, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (2010) available at http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/reference/timestopics/subjects/o/oil-spills/gulf of mexico 2010/index.html?scp=2&sq=gulf
%20of%20mexico%20oil%20spill&st=cse (last visited June 27, 2010).
9. Economist.com, Country Briefings: Brazil: History in Brief, http://www.economist.com/
countries/Brazil (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
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tours are undergoing further redefinition, fueled once again, in large
part, by sugar production. Brazil's economy has been revitalized by
"strong sectors in oil, mining, [and] agriculture," particularly and once
again, by sugar, specifically the biofuel, sugarcane-based ethanol.10
Spurred on by the 1973 oil crisis, Brazil developed the ethanol indus-
try to free itself from dependence on the volatile market for foreign
oil." Brazilian presidential decree 76.593, Proalcool (Programa Na-
cional do Alcool) created a thriving industry with close coordination
across many sectors.12 Brazilian Ministries of Agriculture, Science,
Energy, and others combined with private sector professionals and in-
vestors to develop a thriving industry.' 3 The "Brazilian Model," as it
is known, matched private investment with governmental intervention
and oversight, resulting in more than just freedom from dependence
on foreign oil.14 The Proalcool mandate sought to achieve socio-eco-
nomic goals like decreased regional economic disparities and en-
hanced utilization of land and labor.15 The concerted effort achieved,
and continues to achieve, many of its policy goals, helping to catapult
Brazil into the international community's conversation.
International market demand for oil and food has helped push Bra-
zil further to the forefront of global trade. This demand may disprove
the oft-refrained derogatory adage that Brazil is "the land of the fu-
ture, and always will be."16 This shift has Brazil "enjoying a boom
time as its middle class swells and the country enjoys an unprece-
dented stretch of economic growth .. . set to grow 4.5 percent."17 Bra-
10. Juan de Onis, Brazil's Big Moment: A South American Giant Wakes Up, FOREIGN AFF.,
Nov./Dec. 2008 (explaining that Brazil is poised to move into position as a critical global eco-
nomic player and arguing accordingly that is incumbent upon the next U.S. President to expand
relations with Brazil).
11. Carla Almeida, Sugarcane Ethanol: Brazil's Biofuel Success, ENN, Jan. 3, 2008, available
at http://www.enn.com/ecosystems/article/28580# (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
12. Decreto No. 76.593, de 14 de novembro do 1975, D.O.U. de 20.02.1976 available at http://
projects.wri.org/sd-pams-database/brazillnational-alcohol-program-proalcool (explaining that
Poacool established coordination between the Ministry of Agriculture and sugarcane planters,
the Ministry of Science and Technology and research centers, the Ministry of Industry and Com-
merce and the automobile industry, Ministry of Mines and Energy, PETROBRAS, the fuel dis-
tributors, and the gas stations, the Ministries of Finance and Planning, the Ministry of
Environment and automobile owners).
13. Id.
14. Vanessa M. Cordonnier, Ethanol's Roots: How Brazilian Legislation Created the Interna-
tional Ethanol Boom, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & PO.'Y Rev. 287, 300 (2008).
15. Id. at 295.
16. CLARE M. RIBANDO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND TRADE DivisioN, BRAZIL-U.S.
RELATIONS, 1 (2007), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/RL33456.pdf (reflect-
ing the U.S. view that Brazil historically has and will continue to fail to live up to its potential).
17. Leticia Lozano, Southern Lights: South America Trade, Economy Shake off Effects of U.S.
Slowdown, J. COM., Aug. 4, 2008, at 24.
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zil now has a Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") of $1.58 trillion,
ranking it in the top ten worldwide.18 Furthermore, Brazilian exports
and trade surplus have "soared. . . pushing foreign-exchange reserves
above $100 billion." 19 Brazil's economy is self-sustaining, with "ex-
ports to the United States represent[ing] just 2.5 percent of Brazil's
gross national product." 20 Brazil's market viability and economic sta-
bility, which has never truly occurred simultaneously until now,
prompted Don Hanna, the head of emerging market economics at Ci-
tibank to say, "[w]hat makes Brazil more resilient is that the rest of
the world matters less." 21 The development of the ethanol industry
and this realizing of potential have thrust Brazil into position as a crit-
ical player in the global economy. The interdependence and self-suffi-
ciency that have come to this country of approximately 200 million
people makes it crucial that the U.S. pay close attention to that
position.
Brazil's growth and resiliency have occurred in spite of the United
States. Although a major trade partner, with import and export
figures recently becoming commensurate, 22 the U.S. has consistently
and fervently opposed Brazilian policy in terms of agricultural subsi-
dies.23 In 2002, the Miami Herald quoted former U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative and current World Bank President Robert Zoellick telling
Brazil to "take the southern route to Antarctica" for trade if Brazil
continued to refuse the U.S. backed Free Trade Area of the Americas
("FTAA") agreement. 24 The FTAA was designed to harmonize Latin
America and U.S. economies by eliminating trade barriers and differ-
ences in regulatory schemes. 25 Zoeller's comment came in response
to "Brazil's aggressive stance on trade reform within the context of
the FTAA,"26 following in the wake of the 2001 Doha Conference and
18. de Onis, supra note 9.
19. Land of Promise: Economist Special Report, ECONOMIST BRAZIL (Apr. 14, 2007).
20. Alexei Barrionuevo, Strong Economy Propels Brazil to World Stage, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
2008, at Al (explaining that Brazil's surging economy is positioning it as an emerging geopoliti-
cal power).
21. Id.
22. See U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c3510.html#2007.
23. Becky L. Jacobs, Brazil's Agricultural Trade War: Success and Failure on the Southern
Route to Antarctica, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 167, 171 (2005) (explaining that agricultural
subsidy policy dominates the trade dispute between the U.S. and Brazil-Jacobs fashions this
dispute between the two hemispheric powers as war, and argues that Brazil is, in essence, win-
ning the war by forging trade alliances and rerouting the "geography of world trade").
24. Id. at 168.
25. Id. at 176.
26. Id. at 172.
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the 2002 U.S. Farm Bill. 2 7 Since then, the U.S. shifted its emphasis to
bilateral agreements over the more expansive FTAA proposals. 28
Brazil, in turn, proposed a revised FTAA platform, referred to as the
"Miami Declaration," a sliding scale type system that placed more em-
phasis on "achieve[ing] a greater degree of balance and symmetry be-
tween the rights and commitments of developed and developing
countries in matters of trade." 29
The U.S. response further compounded the situation. The U.S. plan
shifted to "negotiat[ing] on multiple fronts, but sign[ing] only those
deals that don't ask too much of America's protectionist special inter-
ests." 30 This increased Brazilian efforts to reconceptualize and revital-
ize the global agricultural trade system that former Brazilian President
Fernando Henrique Cardosa called the "greatest protectionist and
subsidizing apparatus ever put together for the preservation of the in-
terests of one sector."3 1 This is a commonly held opinion and it moti-
vated Brazil, India, and South Africa, following the 2003 collapse of
negotiations during the Fifth WTO Conference in Cancun, Mexico, to
form the trilateral coalition India-Brazil-South Africa ("IBSA") bloc
in an effort to develop trade and political influence with wealthier na-
tions. 3 2 At the first IBSA summit in 2006, Brazilian President Luiz
Inacio Lula da Silva, affectionately known as "Lula," stressed that
IBSA's goal was to develop further relations with other developing
countries such as China and Argentina.33 The perceived and practical
27. Jacobs, supra note 22, at 172 (explaining that Brazil's push for trade liberalization began
before the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in 2001 but that the Conference
marks a critical turning point in terms of Brazil's accelerated efforts to reform global agricultural
trade; Jacobs explains that the U.S. Farm Bill, which provides for $180 billion in farm subsidies
over ten years, angered Brazil and spurred its attempts to mobilize a global trade policy that
excludes U.S. participation).
28. Id. at 178.
29. Id. at 180.
30. Brink Lindsey, The Miami Fizzle: What Else but a Cancun Redux? WALL ST. J., Nov. 28,
2003, at A9 (arguing that the Bush administration says that it supports a hemispheric free trade
association but instead veils its true agenda in rhetoric that undermines the system; Lindsey
advocates for enhanced American leadership and concessions to Brazil).
31. H.E. Ambassador Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim, MARKET ACCESS DEVELOPMENTS SINCE
THE URUGUAY ROUND: IMPLICATIONS, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES, IN PARTICULAR FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL-
IZATION AND LIBERALIZATION, ADDRESS BEFORE the High Level Segment of the 1998
ECOSOC Substantive Session New York, (July 7, 1998), available at http://www.un.int/brazill
speech/98d-clna-ecosoc-market.html.
32. See Corpwatch.org, Brazil, India and South Africa: Form G3 to counter G8, June 7, 2003,
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=7250.
33. See John Cherian, Trade Triangle, 23 FRONTLINE 19 (2006), available at http://
www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2319/stories/20061006006601300.htm.
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goal of IBSA is the creation of international relations with countries
other than the U.S.
B. Carving a New Geography
Brazil has developed further relations by following the so-called
"Collapse in Cancun," by pursuing a "campaign to construct a new
geography of trade." 3 4 This process began with Brazil expanding its
trade alliances with The Southern Common Market
("MERCOSUR"), 5 the South American trading bloc of Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.3 6  Additionally, Brazil
continued to strengthen its trade relationships within IBSA and be-
yond, becoming major partners with both China and Russia.37 These
relationships are aimed at destabilizing U.S. supremacy in interna-
tional trade and undermining the agricultural subsidy system. The
long-term intention of these alternative models of global trade is to
move sharply ahead of the American curve by eliminating Brazil and
its trade partner's, acceptance of U.S. trade practices.
The rejection of the U.S. model has become increasingly clear: first,
the 2004 WTO rulings on agricultural subsidies went against the
U.S.;38 and second, the collapse of the 2008 Doha round of negotia-
tions occurred.39 Peter Mandelson, the EU Trade Commissioner at
the previous 2006 Doha Round, condemned the U.S. for seeking "dis-
proportionate" subsidy prices from developing countries, insisting that
the U.S. would gain proportionately in other areas of the agreement if
it conceded and accepted agricultural trade cuts. 4 0 Advocates for a
34. Jacobs, supra note 22, at 174-75 (explaining that Brazil's efforts to develop an alternative
market model hinge on successful alliances first with the rest of South America).
35. Id. at 175.
36. JOANNA KLONSKY, MERCOSUR: SOUTH AMERICA'S FRACTious TRADE BLOC (Dec. 7,
2007), http://www.cfr.org/publication/12762/.
37. Jacobs, supra note 22, at 180-82 (explaining that in 2002, Brazilian exports to India were
higher, percentage-wise, than to any other country; Jacobs further explains that not only has
Brazil radically strengthened trade between itself and China and Russia, but it also has made it
clear that it sees the alliances as direct counterbalances to U.S and E.U. global trade dominance
and this "multipolarity" is aimed squarely at eliminating agricultural subsidies in rich nations).
38. Id. at 183 (explaining that the WTO panel concluded that because U.S. subsidies between
1999-2002 exceeded 1992 levels, the U.S. cotton program violated the "Peace Clause," which is
an agreement to cap subsidies at 1992 levels).
39. Stephen Castle & Mark Landler, After 7 Years, Talks Collapse on World Trade, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2008 at Al.
40. Heather Stewart, Mandelson: U.S. Greed Caused Doha Collapse, THE OBSERVER, July 30,
2006, at 2 (explaining that Mandelson thought it preposterous that the U.S. expected to receive
back "dollar for dollar" for its reductions in farm subsidies and that the more fair model lie in an
"exchange rate" system; Stewart explains further that Mandelson considered that the access to
new markets for U.S. industrial goods and services liberalizations would more than compensate
the U.S.).
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Doha agreement had envisioned it as a critical "bulwark against pro-
tectionist sentiments." 41 Its failure, instead, reflects an increasingly
American protectionist system while simultaneously affecting the
"credibility of the World Trade Organization . .. by set[ting] back ef-
forts to work out other multilateral agreements." 42
Brazil argues that the U.S. subsidy program distorts trade by de-
creasing the global agricultural price market. Brazil advocates a new
framework that "calls for deep cuts in tariffs that provide . . . bar-
rier[s]" and that "will eliminate . . . agricultural export subsidies and
... review export credit and export guarantee programs to [protect
against] . . . trade distorting."43 The U.S response has historically
been that its policy does not distort trade because it is "decoupled"
from production and is thus not linked to the global price.44 The U.S.
position has been heavily criticized by the international community
and has included a WTO ruling against U.S. subsidy practices. 45 Crit-
ics contend that the system protects a small section of rich farmers at
the expense of the developing world.46 Another predominant criti-
cism results from the fact that one of the central concepts of the U.S.
subsidy system is that these farmers receive the payments regardless
of production. 47 U.S. refusal to include biofuels among "environmen-
tal goods" scheduled for tariff reduction or elimination further com-
pounds the problem of agricultural subsidies because the U.S.
considers the special environmental designation rules to be for indus-
trial products, not agricultural products.48
41. Castle & Landler, supra note 38 (explaining that the United States, India and China re-
fused to compromise over designs to protect developing countries' farmers from increased trade
liberalization, instead reinforcing protections already afforded to wealthier countries).
42. Id. (explaining that the collapse of the talks positions global trade in terms of current
agreements, instead of under the WTO structure which continues to limit access of developing
countries to consumers in the United States, Europe and Japan).
43. Jacobs, supra note 22, at 186 (explaining the policy it advocates at the 2004 Doha Round).
44. Id. at 183.
45. Frank A. Seminerio, A Tale of Two Subsidies: How Federal Support Programs for Ethanol
and Bio-Diesel Can Be Created in Order to Circumvent Fair Trade Challenges Under World Trade
Organization Rulings 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 963, 964 (2008) (explaining that the criticism is
widespread and that in 2005 the WATO was forced to declare U.S. cotton subsidies illegal when
Brazil a claim against the U.S. before the Dispute Resolution body); See also WTO Dispute
DS267 United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, available at www.wto.org.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 969 (explaining that farmers receive the payments even if they fail to grow any
crops).
48. Jim Lane, Doha Round of Trade Talks: Background, http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/blog2/
2008/07/29/doha-round-of-trade-talks-background.
[Vol. 8:275
SWEET REWARDS
C. Sugarcane's Rewards
Brazil is the epicenter of biofuels production in Latin America, pri-
marily because of its enormous sugarcane industry. A sign above Bra-
zil's first sugar factory, built in 1877, reads "Sweet is the Reward of
Work," and Brazilians hope that this refrain rings true.4 9 This opti-
mism stems from the "green technology" revolution and the potential
central position of Brazil and its surging ethanol industry within that
revolution. Brazil's history is, in many ways, associated with develop-
ment of the sugarcane industry and ethanol is the latest example.
Brazil has demonstrated that sugarcane can be turned into ethanol
more cheaply and efficiently than corn, and that its sugarcane ethanol
is the "only commercially available biofuel that is less expensive than
current gasoline without any new technology development or govern-
ment subsidies."50 Additionally, Brazil has the ample amount of fer-
tile land necessary to expand its industry and, more importantly, its
sugar-based ethanol yield is eight times more productive than U.S.
corn-based ethanol which is grown "at the cost of higher food
prices."51 Furthermore, Brazil "is the only country promoting biofuel
use beyond minimal blending levels by allowing consumers to choose
it as a fuel substitute." 52 Brazil promotes their ethanol domestically
"at almost every gasoline station" and "manufacture[s] flexible fuel
cars" which are capable of using ethanol and or gasoline. 53 The pro-
gram that Brazil offers, in terms of its ethanol industry, is not only
scientific, practical, consumer-driven, environmentally friendly, and
cost effective, but also ambitious.
Brazil's national campaign for widespread implementation and ac-
ceptance of ethanol has positioned its sugarcane industry to become
the global marketplace's primary ethanol producer. Brazil denation-
alized the industry in 2007, allowing domestic and foreign investors to
enter the market. Currently, the private market produces 18 billion
liters of ethanol per year with 4 billion liters in exports which accounts
49. Roger Cohen, Is Ethanol for Everybody? N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at A20 (explaining the
role of the ethanol industry in terms of Brazil's social realities).
50. Alexis Madrigal, Ethos Looks to Latin American Ethanol,earth2tech, Jan. 3, 2008, http://
earth2tech.com/2008/01/03/ethos-looks-to-latin-american-ethanol.
51. Cohen, supra note 48 (explaining that American ethanol production, capability, and use
far under achieved in comparison with that of Brazil).
52. William Coyle, The Future of Biofuels: A Global Perspective, AMBER WAVEs, U.S. Dept.
of Agric. (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/November07/Features/
Biofuels.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
53. Id. (explaining that proposed U.S. legislation would provide incentives for creating a simi-
lar market with the U.S.)
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for over half the world's market. 54 By 2013, ethanol consumption in
Brazil will likely double, and by 2020 international ethanol trade will
likely increase twenty-five fold.5 5 The U.S. produces the highest
amount of ethanol, but Brazil is the world's largest ethanol exporter.56
The United States currently imports the majority of Brazilian ethanol
but charges an inflated 54 cent tariff on every gallon to protect Ameri-
can corn farmers.57 In addition to the import tariff, the U.S. also pro-
vides a heavy subsidy of 51 cents per gallon produced by its own
ethanol industry; an industry that does not have the required geogra-
phy to support sugarcane based feedstock and, instead, produces an
inferior corn-based feedstock.58
Former President Bush outlined the American ethanol model when
he signed into law the Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007.59 The Act contains a governmental requirement that 36 billion
gallons of transportation fuel be provided by biofuels by 2022.60 Of
that, 15 billion gallons are to be derived from corn-based ethanol and
the remaining 21 billion gallons are to be derived from cellulosic etha-
nol sources, like switchgrass. 61 To achieve such lofty goals will require
relying on half of America's total corn production and developing
technology to make the cellulosic ethanol even remotely profitable.62
Both solutions, reliance on U.S. corn and immediate development of
technology, suggest a host of potential problems, including added eco-
nomic impingements on already cash-strapped corporations and con-
sumers. But the U.S. has not been swayed in its determination to
follow Brazil's lead in developing its own domestic ethanol industry,
riding the wave of what Congresswoman Deborah Pryce calls the "re-
54. The Economy of Heat, THE ECONoMIST, Apr. 14, 2007, at 9.
55. Id.
56. See Bradley S. Klapper, Brazil Presses US, EU to Include Ethanol in any WTO Trade Pact,
INT'L Bus. TIMES, July 28, 2008.
57. Jeff Cox, Sugarcane Ethanol's Not So Sweet Future, CNN MONEY, Aug. 7, 2007, available
at http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/06/news/economy/sugarcane-ethanollindex.htm (discussing the
barriers Brazil faces in entering the U.S. market).
58. Id. (explaining that American insistence on its own long-term ethanol industry does little
to nothing to alleviate short term American dependence on foreign oil).
59. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17001).
60. See Id. at § 202, 121 Stat. 1492, 1521-22 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545).
61. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. On Energy & Natural Res., H.R. 6, Energy Indepen-
dence and Security Act of 2007.
62. Peter Z. Grossman, If Ethanol is the Answer, What is the Question? 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 149, 150 (2008).
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newable energy revolution." 63 The differences between the Brazilian
and U.S. industries are striking. The U.S. policy of subsidies and tar-
iffs seems contrary to not only its own stated agenda of eliminating
dependence on foreign oil, but also to more complex international
concerns.
On first impression, dependence on Brazilian ethanol seems noth-
ing more than a shift in reliance from one region's resources to an-
other's. However, American dependence on Middle Eastern oil
reserves requires trade with state actors far more unreliable than Bra-
zil. As then-Senator Obama remarked as far back as early 2006, "if
there's a single example out there that encapsulates the ability of un-
stable, undemocratic governments to wield undue influence over
America's national security, [it is U.S. dependence on Middle East
oil.]"64 A shift to reliance on Brazilian ethanol would still represent
dependence on foreign energy, however; that dependence would be
on a democratic country that, traditionally, the U.S. has had good re-
lations with and on a country that is the most economically and politi-
cally influential in its region.
D. Geopolitics and the Emerging Markets
The relationship between a thriving economy and geopolitical influ-
ence has been clearly delineated by the history of the Western hegem-
ony. One need not be a systems theorist to understand the intricate
reciprocal relationship between money and power and see that the
U.S. and Brazilian accumulation of both are shifting. The develop-
ment of an emerging market new world order has occurred alongside
the so called American "credit crunch" and the unprecedented U.S.
financial downturn and recession. For the first time since the indus-
trial revolution, Western paradigm seems threatened by a "gradual
loss of the dominance of world affairs." 65 The shift in the balance of
63. Editorial, Congresswoman Deborah Pryce, Ethanol is Fueling America's Quest for En-
ergy Independence (Apr. 9, 2007), available at www.house.gov/pryce/07%20releases/040907
EthanolOpEd.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
64. Senator Barack Obama, Energy Security is National Security, Remarks Before Gover-
nor's Ethanol Coalition (Feb. 28, 2006) available at http://obamaspeeches.com/054-Energy-Se-
curity-is-National-Security-Governors-Ethanol-Coalition-Obama-Speech.htm. (detailing that
America needs to move away from an oil-based economy for many reasons but primarily be-
cause U.S. dependence on foreign oil creates major national security risks and that a large part
of the $18 million that the U.S. spends on foreign oil every hour directly funds anti-American
terrorist organizations).
65. COHEN-TANUGI, supra note 4, at 27 (arguing that "end of the West" is not a result of
divide between American and European sensibilities, but rather a decline resulting from the
economic realities resulting from a redistribution of industry, wealth, and power from the tradi-
tional Western powers to new emerging markets like Brazil, Russia, India, and China).
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power from the "Western duopoly" to a more diversified multipoly
emerges out of a spectrum of factors including global population in-
crease, international backlash to American foreign policy, growing
dissatisfaction with financial institutions, and an increase in intellec-
tual capital in developing markets. 66 With more people in more
places, continued U.S. international aggression, a global financial
nightmare, and strengthened competition in non-Western labor forces,
the current global power structure seems increasingly built like a
house of cards. This inevitable reshuffling of the traditional Western
paradigm of global power will necessarily leave a vacuum for others to
fill.
The emergence of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
other emerging nations) on the international stage appears to provide
realistic options ready to fill that space. 67 Like Brazil-Russia, India,
and China-have all redefined their position in the global economy in
the last few decades. 68 Russia's GDP has more than quadrupled since
1999 due to elevated prices of oil and natural gas, which are industries
Vladimir Putin nationalized and used as an economic bridge to politi-
cal influence over counties without these resources. 69 Meanwhile, In-
dia's economy has the second highest growth rate and is anticipated to
overcome China's rate by 2015, making India the most populous coun-
try with the third largest economy by 2050.70 China's economy has
grown nearly 10% annually for the last thirty years, becoming the
third largest economy in 2007 with a GDP that is forecasted to surpass
Japan and the United States, second and first respectively, within the
next thirty years. 7'
Brazil, alongside these countries, represents a threatening new dy-
namism to the American economy and American geopolitical power.
Globalization has provided these countries with the means to this en-
66. Id. at 28 (arguing that the shift in world power is as complicated and multifaceted as the
world that has historically been without that power).
67. Andrew Tanzer, Profit from the Fantastic Four, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN., Aug. 2008, Vol.
62, Issue 8, at 25-29.
68. Prashanth N.Bharadwaj, BRIC Countries-A Competitive Analysis, J. GLOBAL COMPETI-
TIVENESs, 2006, at 52-54.
69. COHEN-TANUGI, supra note 4, at 18-19 (arguing that though Russia has previously exper-
ienced being a global superpower, its power was never, until now, tied to economic good fortune
and that Russia resources have not only provided an economic windfall but also significant polit-
ical leverage over the countries that are dependant upon those resources).
70. Id. at 17-18 (arguing that India's abundance of low cost labor and a large, highly competi-
tive middle class along with what will soon be the world's largest population provide India with
the requisite elements for global superpower status).
71. Id. note 4, at 15-16 (arguing that China's massive population and size coupled with its
"feverish growth rate," and the fact that China is the world's largest holder of foreign exchange
reserves currently places China as the primary threat to U.S. supremacy).
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terprising existence and has "indirectly transformed world geopolitics;
it has increased rather than reduced international tensions, and this
transformation has in turn changed the very nature of globaliza-
tion." 72 The twentieth-century struggle for equal status amongst peo-
ples and nation states found globalization as a powerful economic
instrument and today, with the redistribution of capital to emerging
markets, the Western model of politics is threatened once again.73 To-
day, globalization represents a growing interdependence between eco-
nomics and politics, 7 4 and the emerging multipolarity of Brazil,
Russia, India, and China threatens to ostracize the U.S. economy and
emasculate U.S. international influence.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Liberalized Trade between the U.S. and Brazil and Domestic
Economic Stimulation
Whether it becomes a crystallizing moment in the gradual shift of
global power or not remains to be seen, but the failure of the Doha
negotiations, which stem, in large part, from a conflict between the
U.S. and Brazil, seem inexorably representative of larger problems on
the horizon. The Doha collapse of 2008 and the insecurity surround-
ing the 2010 round of negotiations echo historic international disputes
of self-interested states paralyzed by the fear of sacrificing a scintilla
of their respective sovereignty or supremacy. This sentiment, which
tracks much of modern civilized history, seems acutely reflected by
Karl Marx's idea that "heavenly bodies, once thrown into a certain
definite motion, always repeat this, so it is with social production."75
This analogy stems from Marx's application of the first law of
Newtonian physics-that bodies are prone to sit still or stay on the
same path absent some outside motivation-to the discourse of eco-
nomics. Marx's conception seems applicable to both U.S. and Brazil-
ian stubbornness during the Doha negotiations, but Newton's law
seems more metaphorically aligned in that it seeks to present both
what is and what may be. The sedentary nature of U.S. policy coupled
with the "historic convergence of economic power with demographic
preponderance in the developing word,"76 in particular Brazilian
72. Id. at 24.
73. Andrew Hurrel, Hegemony, Liberalism, and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be
Great Powers?, 82 INT'L AFF. 2 (2006).
74. COHEN-TANUGI, supra note 4, at 25.
75. John P. Burnett, Marx's Concept of an Economic Law of Motion, HIST. POL. ECON. Sum-
mer 2000 at 381.
76. COHEN-TANUGI, supra note 4, at 28.
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power and preponderance, seems destined to fall victim to the laws of
both physics and economics. In other words, it is crucial the U.S. rec-
ognize the need to engage Brazil, and its emerging status as develop-
ing global power, agricultural titan, and biofuel pioneer, before
America's influence and economy come crashing back to Earth.
The U.S. farm subsidies and ethanol import tariffs are designed to
protect against foreign penetration and support the domestic market,
and for years they have done just that. However, these policies have
recently come under increasing criticism from international pressure
to reform and mounting evidence that the diversion of cropland from
food to fuel has contributed to the spike in worldwide food prices.77
The recent oil and commodities price tumble has not changed this as
food prices have remained high both in developing countries and
within the U.S.78 This situation is one the United Nations believes will
continue for years to come.79 This is further accentuated by the fact
that while the Obama administration and contemporary American
culture continue to sound the refrain of eliminating U.S. dependence
on foreign oil, the U.S. ethanol system continues to prove itself less
effective and more expensive than the Brazilian model. A shift to-
wards the Brazilian model would signal a tangible step away from de-
pendence on foreign oil. Furthermore, in addition to lessening U.S.
dependence on foreign oil, a shift in trade policy with Brazil could also
provide America with economic relief in terms of increased domestic
competition, a revitalized U.S. farming system, and opportunities for
further foreign investment in a U.S. backed Brazilian ethanol industry
infrastructure.
1. Domestic Development
Opening the U.S. markets to Brazilian ethanol would strengthen
the U.S. economy. Embracing Brazilian ethanol by eliminating or de-
creasing tariffs and subsidies could provide the U.S. with the impetus
to refocus its emphasis on domestic development of alternative and
renewable energy models and thus inject the U.S. economy with new
job growth. The U.S. built its reputation as the world superpower by
fostering a collective, fundamental desire for autonomy and develop-
ing unparalleled intellectual capital to achieve that desire. The U.S.
can rebound from its wavering international status and the current
economic crisis by relying once more on American self-actualization
77. Cohen, supra note 48.
78. Clifford Krauss, Commodity Prices Tumble, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008 available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/business/economy/14commodities.html.
79. Id.
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and innovation. Allowing Brazil's ethanol into the U.S. market will
directly stimulate the U.S. domestic economy by driving domestic
competition and development in two evolving sectors of green tech-
nology. First, with a surplus of affordable ethanol at the American
consumer's disposal, the immediate need for flex-fuel or entirely etha-
nol fueled transportation would provide a much needed boost to
America's sagging automobile industry while lowering consumer costs
at the pump. Secondly, an industry-wide acceptance of Brazilian etha-
nol would forge a new standard for alternative or green energy in
America and would consequently motivate development of alterna-
tive models of non-fossil fuel based energy. Together, this two-fold
development would provide the U.S. with immediate domestic eco-
nomic stimulation.
An unfettered flow of Brazilian sugarcane ethanol would stimulate
the domestic economy by expanding the product base of American
automobile makers, providing jobs for Americans developing and
building those products, and inspiring alternative product market
competition. With a surplus of an available fuel alternative and the
requisite essentials of supply and demand, U.S. automakers would be
hard-pressed not to focus development efforts on flex-fuel or all etha-
nol-based automobiles. An industry-wide emphasis on development
would in turn create new jobs in design, development, and assembly of
the new automobiles. The U.S. could look to Brazil in terms of devel-
opment initiatives for the auto industry. Brazil worked closely with its
automakers to set and meet "extraordinary goals for the production of
flex fuel cars."80 The government now mandates a requirement that
all new vehicles have flex-fuel capabilities.81 The Fuel Choices for
American Security Act, a bill introduced to the Senate, has a similar
requirement. 82 Allowing entrance of Brazil's ethanol would motivate
American automakers to expand their production base and develop
automobiles to take advantage of the readily available consumer alter-
native while motivating the government to create the proper legisla-
tion to support the industry.
Invigorating the business model of the green technology industry by
making it profitable and competitive would logically stimulate alter-
nate industry models. If consumers and automakers respond oppor-
tunistically to one viable source of alternative and renewable energy,
it follows that they would respond similarly to others. That response
80. Cordonnier, supra note 13, at 313.
81. Id. at 300.
82. Vehicle and Fuel Choices for American Security Act of 2005, S. 2025, 109th Cong.
§ 209(a) (2005).
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could be driven by American innovation. Why all this has yet to oc-
cur, stems from many factors including a general resistance to chang-
ing the models of consumption Americans have grown accustomed to.
No alternative models of energy have proved as efficient or enduring,
nor occupied as much a place in American life as oil. All that could
change with one example of an economic and technological feasibility
alternative; Brazilian sugarcane ethanol can be that example.
The market for infusion and growth is ripe for such a change; never
in American history have so many diverse sectors of the population,
from corporation to consumer, been as educated and interested in al-
ternative and renewable energy. Wal-Mart, as emblematic as any
American company, recently committed itself to a company-wide in-
vestment in green technologies.83  Included in Wal-Mart's plan is
doubling the fuel efficiency of its "7,000 huge Class 8 trucks that get
about 6 miles per gallon." 84 Even more critical is Wal-Mart's commit-
ment to increasing the market for green technology by integrating
green products on its store shelves. Wal-Mart advisor Glenn Prickett
of Conservation International believes this commitment "can have a
revolutionary impact on the market for green technologies."8 5 Count-
less other U.S. corporations have pursued similar initiatives in recent
years. General Motors recently received the "2009 Best New Green
Technology" award at the Montreal Auto Show for its "Two-Mode
Hybrid technology" vehicle was called "a tremendous validation of
the green transformation that has been under way at General Mo-
tors," by Marc Comeau the Vice President of GM sales in Canada. 86
A Midwestern group composed of state government officials and non-
government organizations are advocating for $2 billion out of the fed-
eral economic stimulus package to support green projects they argue
are environmentally friendly and would produce 30,000 new jobs.87
83. Thomas Friedman, The Power of Green, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007 § 6, at 16.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Marketwire, General Motors' Two-Mode Hybrid Powertrain Voted "2009 Best New
Green Technology," http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/General-Motors-Two-Mode-Hy-
brid-Powertrain-Voted-2009-Best-New-Green-Technology-938470.htm (last visited Apr. 21,
2010)..
87. Scott Bauer, Coalition Pushes Green Technology in Stimulus, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 2009
http://www.midwestadvocates.org/media/coverage/2009/1-13-08%2OCicago%20Tribune%20
Coalition%20Pushes%2OGreen%20Tecnology%20in%20Stimu available at http://archives.
chicagotribune.com/2009/jan/13/local/chi-ap-wi-greeneconomy (last visited Apr. 1, 2009) http://
www.midwestadvocates.org/medialcoverage/2009/1-13-08%2OCicago%20Tribune%20Coalition
%20Pushes%20Green%2OTecnology%20in%20Stimulus.htm http://www.midwestadvocates.org/
media/coverage/2009/1-13-08%2OCicago%2OTribune%2OCoalition%20Pushes%20Green%20
Tecnology%20in%2OStimulus.htm(last visited April 21, 2010). Scott Bauer, Coalition Pushes
Green Technology in Stimulus, CHI. TRIB., January 13, 2009 available at http://www.midwest
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Even the airline industry has instigated development of green technol-
ogy with Continental Airlines recently reporting that its biofuel test-
ing on aircraft showed no negative impact. 8 What this means is that
U.S. businesses views green technology as a viable industry, one that
can be capitalized on while simultaneously helping to cut internal
costs, passing along savings to customers, and improving the corporate
image by helping the environment.
The American people seem ready to embrace green technology as
well. President Obama "offers a set of forceful proposals" designed to
develop green technology.89 His plan is to "provide fifteen billion dol-
lars a year for developing alternative-energy sources and creating job-
training programs in green technologies." 90 This plan follows the En-
ergy Independence and Security Act of 2007, the comprehensive legis-
lative guidance aimed at increasing American reliance on alternative
and renewable energy sources.91 The Act's "Renewable Fuels Stan-
dard set a target for the country to produce 100 million gallons of
cellulosic ethanol" in 2009.92 However, even with new investment
and construction, "producers seem likely to fall well short."93 Presi-
dent Obama's signing of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act further catapults renewable energy into the forefront of
American economic consciousness. 94 He contends that the bill will
advocates.org/media/coverage/2009/1-13-08%20Cicago%2OTribune%20Coalition%20Pushes
%20Green%2OTecnology%20in%2OStimulus.htm (last visited April 21, 2010). Sco-rr BAUER,
Coalition Pushes Green Technology in Stimulus. CHI. TRIB., January 13, 2009 available at Scott
Bauer, Coalition Pushes Green Technology in Stimulus, CHI. TRIB., January 13, 2009 available at
http://www.midwestadvocates.org/media/coverage/2009/1-13-08%20Cicago%20Tribune%20
Coalition%20Pushes%20Green%20Tecnology%20in%20Stimulus.htm(last visited April 21,
2010). Scott Bauer, Coalition Pushes Green Technology in Stimulus, CHI. TRIB., January 13, 2009
available at http://www.midwestadvocates.org/medialcoverage/2009/1-13-08%20Cicago%20
Tribune%20Coalition%2OPushes%20Green%20Tecnology%20in%20Stimulus.htm (last visited
April 21, 2010) (last visited April 1, 2009).
88. Bill Hensel Jr., Biofuel Passes Post-Flight Tests at Continental, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 7, 2009,
at Al.
89. Editorial, The Choice, NEW YORKER, Oct. 13, 2008, available at http://www.newyorker.
com/talk/comment/2008/10/13/081013tacotalk-editors (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
90. Id.
91. U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, HR 6 The Energy Indepen-
dence and Security Act of 2007, http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Issue
Items.Detail&IssueltemID=fl0ca3dd-fabd-4900-aa9d-cl9de47df2da&Month=12&Year=2007
(last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
92. Kate Galbraith, "For Ethanol Plants, Two Roads Diverge," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2009,
available at http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/13/for-ethanol-plants-two-roads-diverge/
?scp=1&sq=ethanol%20automobiles&st=cse.
93. Id.
94. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codi-
fied as scattered in sections of 26 U.S.C., 1 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 15 U.S.C.).
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"transform the way [Americans] use energy." 95 The bill commits,
among other things, $2 billion for research into electric cars, $500 mil-
lion to train Americans for "green jobs," a tax credit extension for
alternative fuel projects, and an option that allows "green" developers
to transform tax credits into cash.96 This investment reflects an unpar-
alleled economic commitment that stands to redefine America's rela-
tionship to green technology and alternative and renewable energy.
The Federal mandate reflects consumer expectations and desires as
well. Although American perception about the importance of alter-
native and renewable energy is intricately linked to a variety of fac-
tors, some surveys suggest that up to 80% of Americans endorse
Federal incentive programs aimed towards alternative and renewable
energy development.97 This enthusiasm stretches across the U.S. and,
similar to the fervor exhibited during the dot com boom, Silicon Val-
ley venture capitalists have already heavily invested in green technol-
ogy development prior to the onset of the current global economic
crisis9 8 or the devastating spill in the Gulf of Mexico. A combination
of market economics and market innovation spurred Brazil's ethanol
investment and development and it seems that now is the right time
for the U.S. to redefine its energy industry. Because Brazilian sugar
cane ethanol "is profitable when oil prices are more than $40 a barrel
[and] oil prices currently hover around $80,"99 Brazilians, as far back
as the 1970s, decided to change the way their industry worked. The
95. Kate Galbraith, Obama Signs Stimulus Package Packed with Clean Energy Provisions,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009 available at http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/obama-signs-
stimulus-packed-with-clean-energy-provisions/?scp=1&sq=stimulus%20bill%20and%20clean
%20energy&st=cse.
96. Id.
97. Nuclear Energy Institute, Eight of Ten Americans Support Federal Incentives to Spur
Growth of Carbon-Free Energy Technology, available at http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/news
releases/americansupport/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). Nuclear Energy Institute, Eight of 10
Americans Support Federal Incentives to Spur Growth of Carbon-Free Energy Technology, avail-
able at http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/americanssupport/ (last visited April 21,
2010).
Nuclear Energy Institute, Eight of 10 Americans Support Federal Incentives to Spur Growth of
Carbon-Free Energy Technology, available at http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/
americanssupport/ (last visited April 21, 2010).Nuclear Energy Institute, Eight of 10 Americans
Support Federal Incentives to Spur Growth of Carbon-Free Energy Technology, available at http://
www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/americanssupport/ (last visited April 21, 2010).
EARTHTIMES.ORG, Eight of 10 Americans Support Federal Incentives to Spur Growth of Carbon-
Free Energy Technology, available at Nuclear Energy Institute, Eight of 10 Americans Support
Federal Incentives to Spur Growth of Carbon-Free Energy Technology, available at http://
www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/americanssupport/ (last visited April 21, 2010). (last
visited April 2, 2009).
98. Matt Ricthel, "Start-Up Fervor Shifts to Energy in Silicon Valley," N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2007, at Al.
99. Gerard Wynn, Gasoline still has some Advantages as Fuel, N. Y. TIMEs, , Apr. 4, 2010.
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Brazilian government worked with Brazilian investors and consumers
to develop a decidedly different market strategy that stimulated the
Brazilian economy from within. That stimulation has become not only
a major point of envy for other countries, but also a direct target of
foreign investment, further strengthening Brazil's economy. 100 Today,
the U.S. finds itself with a weakened economy, an ongoing depen-
dence on foreign oil, and a consumer base that demands change. A
U.S. market of politicians, consumers, and investors await the alterna-
tive fuel industry that Brazilian sugarcane ethanol could provide.
Opening up trade borders to Brazilian sugarcane ethanol would
stimulate the U.S. domestic economy by accelerating the developing
alternative ethanol industry. Brazil's one misstep in its ethanol indus-
try may be its concentration on just sugarcane. Diversification of the
types of biofuels used within the U.S. is a necessary and beneficial
step towards a comprehensive domestic industry. Large monocultures
of one crop can be greatly detrimental to surrounding ecosystems. 101
Additionally, diversity allows for more market competition. Allowing
Brazilian ethanol to penetrate the U.S. market would act as a bridge.
It would symbolize a temporary reliance on an alternative energy that
would create market acceptance and market competition. With Bra-
zilian ethanol market penetration, American scientists, investors, and
corporations would be significantly motivated to develop alternatives
to the foreign product. Second generation biofuels offer promise of
that alternative.
Second generation cellulosic ethanol derived from different non-
food sources or "biomass" such as wood waste, crop waste, and cer-
tain grasses like switchgrass.102 These are not annual crops and can be
harvested year round.103 Additionally, second generation cellulosic
ethanol does not require croplands and instead can grow in diverse
environments across the U.S. 104 Furthermore, some types of cellulosic
100. Guy Chazan & Paulo Prada, Shell Plans $1.63 Billion Investment in Brazilian Ethanol,
The Wall Street Journal Business Section, (Feb. 2, 2010) (discussing how Royal Dutch Shell's
deal is the largest thus far investment into biofuels anywhere and how the deal will give Shell
"access to a world-wide distribution network and the option of selling its ethanol overseas," help
push for changes in protectionist-policy driven countries, and "expand Brazilian ethanol's global
presence" in the marketplace and around the globe. Furthermore, the article goes on to explain
how the deal would give Shell access to the second generation or cellulosic ethanol technology
that is being developed in Brazil).
101. Michael Pollan, When a Crop Becomes King, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2002, at A20.
102. Lee R. Lynd, Cellulosic Ethanol Fact Sheet 1 (2003) available at http://bipar-
tisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/TAC4.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
103. Malinda McAleer-Pennington, Can Biofuels Solve the Problems of American Foreign Oil
Dependence? 16 SOUTHEASTERN ENvrTL. L. J. 457, 474 (2008)
104. Id.
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ethanol, like switchgrass, which can produce "five times more energy
than it takes to grow, harvest, and deliver," offer exceptional energy
value potential. 05 Other alternatives offer similar advantages as well.
These alternatives provide more than just a solution to the problems
monocultures present; they also provide for the real possibility of mar-
ket competition and the requisite economic growth. The entry of Bra-
zilian ethanol would provide a ceiling of alternative products and
corporations and consumers would respond by creating an internal
domestic marketplace for production and consumption of alternative
and renewable energy.
2. Revitalization of the U.S. Farm Industry
Opening up the Brazilian ethanol market by eliminating or decreas-
ing tariffs and subsidies could also revitalize the U.S farm system,
which is in desperate need of change. The American food and agricul-
ture industry was organized to maximize production at all costs and
rely on cheap energy in doing so."106 The farming industry "uses
more fossil fuel than any other sector of the economy - 19 percent,"
except for the automobile industry.107 American corn production in
particular requires more pesticides (which are made from oil) and ni-
trogen fertilizer (made from natural gas) than any other crop.108 The
farm industry "contributes more greenhouse gases to the atmosphere
than anything else [Americans] do-as much as 37 percent, according
to one study."10 9 Irrigation for agricultural production uses more
freshwater resources than any other American industry."10 Close to
one-third of all American cropland has been classified as "highly
erodible land" because of agricultural practices."' These endemic
problems of the American farm system require a change.
The American people are trending away from the industrial farm
system because of its widespread negative impact on the environment,
but cultural reasons are also playing a role in that change. With an
increased appetite for local and organic foods, and more focus on
what people are eating, Americans seem poised for wide-scale
changes in the farming industry. A "gathering sense among the public
105. Cordonnier, supra note 13, at 312.
106. Michael Pollan, Farmer in Chief, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 9, 2008, at 10, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/magazine/12policy-t.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2010)..
107. Id.
108. Pollan, supra note 100, at 20.
109. Id.
110. Stacey Willemsen Person, International Trade: Pushing United States Agriculture Toward
a Greener Future? 17 GEO. INT'L ENvT. L. REv. 307, 309 (2005).
111. Id. at 310.
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that the industrial-food system is broken," suggests that the American
farming industry needs to necessarily think of alternatives.1 12
The global economic crisis has also impacted the U.S. farm industry.
Recent U.S. Department of Agriculture figures suggest the global re-
cession is lowering demand expectations and increasing supplies, par-
ticularly in terms of U.S. corn grown for ethanol production.113
Infusion of Brazilian ethanol into the U.S. market could foster the
change needed by forcing unfarmed land, subsidized by the govern-
ment, back into development, it could motivate American farms dedi-
cated to corn-based ethanol to restructure and concentrate on
alternatives. Further, it could provide American farmers with an al-
ternative and renewable energy model of production.
Infusion of ethanol into U.S. markets would force the U.S. govern-
ment to reconsider its vacant farm land subsidy program created by
the 1996 Farm Bill and scarcely altered by the 2008 Farm Bill.114 The
1996 Bill's original intent was to gradually eliminate the subsidy sys-
tem established by Roosevelt's New Deal."15 Instead the 1996 Farm
Bill expanded the subsidy program and strengthened the farming
lobby. According to the Washington Post, "the federal government
has paid at least $1.3 billion," between 2000 and 2006 to, "individuals
who do no farming at all."11 6 These payments have in large part bene-
fited "millionaire landowners, foreign speculators and absentee land-
lords, as well as farmers."11 7 The 2008 Farm Bill requires subsidy
recipients to provide "some documentation to prove that they have
played a role in managing a farm," but it does not "set a minimum
time commitment" or "measurable standard," making it "easy for
people to collect subsidies even if they have limited involvement in
farming.""" Proponents of this policy argue that the subsidy program
is necessary in order to keep the American farm economy stable and
ensure a low cost food supply to the American people.1' 9 This belief
is further reinforced politically because more than half of all U.S. Sen-
112. Id.
113. Joe Walker, Farmers Could See Declining Receipts: Demand, Energy, Currency to Affect
Grain Prices, PADUCAH SUN, Jan. 18, 2009, available at http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/
viewiStockNews/articleid/2962867 (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
114. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act, Pub. L. No. 110-246, (2008).
115. Dan Morgan, Farm Program Pays 1.3 Billion to People Who Don't Farm, WASH. POST,
July 2, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/
01/AR2006070100962.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Philip Brasher, Will Obama Create Limits on Farm Subsidies, Jan. 5, 2009, available at
http://www.jacksonsun.com/article/20090105/NEWS01/901050310 (last visited Jan. 19, 2009).
119. Person, supra note 109, at 313.
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ators come from rural farming states; and symbolically, many people
identify with the image of the traditional American farmer. 120 How-
ever, this belief is rapidly becoming an antiquated notion as more and
more land is commercialized and subsidized, often going unused or
underutilized.
Eliminating the subsidies to American farmers producing corn for
ethanol production would refocus the industry's attention on the value
of the subsidy system. Miles of unused land currently subsidized
could be transformed into land dedicated to the $1 billion in incen-
tives geared towards production of the cellulosic biofuels that the 2008
Bill legislates.121 Instead of paying landowners not to use their land,
the Federal Government could encourage further development of a
non-corn-based ethanol industry. The current system of cellulosic eth-
anol production "is in a transition phase from research to commercial
production, with 39 facilities in the construction or planning stage,
with production scheduled for this year or next."122 If Brazilian etha-
nol is allowed in and establishes a viable market, farmers could capi-
talize by severing ties with one form of government payment and
accepting alternative forms like loans for cellulosic or other crop de-
velopment. The 2009 U.S. Recovery Act slotted $786.5 million to-
wards the development of an alternative biofuels U.S. marketplace. 123
This Act corresponds with the development of the "BIOFUELS INTER-
AGENCY WORKING GROUP," an interagency organization whose core
goals consist of the development of a U.S. biofuel market that in-
cludes next generation biofuels and flex-fuel vehicle production.124
Accordingly, the emphasis on non-corn-based ethanol has begun to
take foot in the U.S.125 Furthermore, since second generation ethanol
sources can grow in adverse and non-traditional environments,
cropland damaged by the American agricultural industry may have a
120. Id.
121. House Committee on Agriculture, (2008) http://agriculture.house.gov/insidel
FarmBill.html.
122. Cattle Network, available at http://www.cattlenetwork.com/Content.asp?ContentlD=
283771 (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
123. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, President Obama Announces
Steps to support Sustainable Energy Options, (May 5, 2009), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov (search "sustainable energy").
124. Id.
125. Keith Johnson, Next Gen Biofuel: Vereniun's Riva on Cellulosic Ethanol's Challenges,
Wall Street Journal's "Environmental Capital" blog (May 7, 2009), available at http:/l
blogs.wsj.com (discussing how following the Obama's administration announcement about U.S.
government funding for alternative forms of renewable energy, the market took it as an endorse-
ment of cellulosic ethanol production prompting "[s]hares in Verenium Corp., one of the very
few publicly traded cellulosic ethanol companies, [to rise] more than 70% since the new biofuel
policy was announced").
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second developmental life. With over $1 billion slated for ethanol de-
velopment and not nearly enough farmers involved in production, the
empty subsidized land could be used in the construction and develop-
ment of cellulosic ethanol production invigorating the domestic econ-
omy and revitalizing the farming industry.
Lifting subsidies on unused land coupled with the glut of govern-
ment funding available for cellulosic ethanol production could moti-
vate both unused farm owners and farm owners dedicated to corn-
based ethanol to restructure and concentrate on alternative models of
ethanol production. Cellulosic ethanol is produced "by breaking
down the tough cellular material that gives plants [their] rigidity and
structure and converting the resulting sugar into ethanol." 126 Ameri-
can ethanol farming has been overwhelmingly dedicated to corn-
based technologies but because cellulosic ethanol demonstrates such
an upside, farmers, scientists, and investors are laboring to develop
methods to make it as price competitive as corn-based ethanol.
The U.S. Energy Department initially predicted that ethanol pro-
duced from cellulosic waste "would be in the market by about 2009 in
the same volume as ethanol from the conventional source, corn." 127
Although inaccurate, this prediction was predicated in large part on
cellulosic ethanol's presence and potential. The basis of cellulosic eth-
anol is that "cellulose is the world's most widely available biological
material, present in such low-value materials as wood chips and wood
waste, fast-growing grasses, crop residues like corn stover, and munici-
pal waste." 128 The potential of cellulosic ethanol is unlimited since
"[a] cellulosic ethanol process would raise the ethanol yields from sug-
arcane by about one-third an acre by using parts of the sugar plant
that are now thrown away as waste," and the same can be said for
"material that is not currently considered a crop, like switch grass or
wood chips left over from paper making." 129 Additionally, less en-
ergy is needed than in corn-based ethanol production. 130 The USDA
recently announced its first ever guaranteed loan for the development
of commercial scale cellulosic ethanol production. 131 The Section
9003 Biorefinery Assistance Program, authorized by the 2008 Farm
Bill, approved the $80 million loan to Range Fuels, Inc. in Soperton,
126. Coyle, supra note 51.
127. Matthew Wald & Alexei Barrioneuvo, Chasing a Dream Made of Waste, N.Y TIMES,
Apr. 17, 2007, at C1.
128. Coyle, supra note 51.
129. Wald & Barrioneuvo, supra note 126.
130. Id.
131. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., USDA Approves First Ever Gaurunteed Loan for
Commercial Scale Cellulosic Plant, Release No. 0024.09 (Jan. 16, 2009).
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Ga.132 The Biorefinery Assistance Program promotes development of
new and emerging technologies for the production of advanced bi-
ofuelS133 and the loan reflects a top-down economic commitment to
accelerated development of these technologies. Allowing Brazilian
sugarcane ethanol into U.S. markets coupled with the immediate pos-
sibilities offered by the alternative model of cellulosic ethanol and
available government funding should further this development by cre-
ating the necessary impetus to inspire widespread restructuring of the
American farm system.
3. Foreign Investment Potential
Opening the U.S. markets to Brazilian ethanol product penetration
would strengthen the U.S. economy by providing new avenues of di-
rect foreign investment in the rapidly developing Brazilian market.
Even with overall reductions in investment due to the global financial
crisis,134 Brazil remains an important destination for foreign invest-
ment.135 The U.S. is already Brazil's largest trade partnerl 36 but al-
lowing Brazilian ethanol to penetrate the U.S. market could further
strengthen and extend that relationship. In 2007, the U.S. signed a
memorandum of understanding to advance cooperation on biofuels
with Brazil.137 This agreement emphasizes the significance of biofuels
as "a transformative force in the region to diversify energy supplies,
bolster economic prosperity, advance sustainable development, and
protect the environment."13 8  It does not, however, alter the biofuel
trade landscape between the two countries. While the U.S. may be
advancing cooperative understandings with Brazil, Brazil is develop-
ing actual trade relations with other countries. Brazil's strengthened
trade relationships with Russia, India, China, and other nations means
that the U.S. stands to lose out on the economic stimulation that in-
vestment in Brazil offers. With Brazil's recent discovery of an oil field
containing some five billion to eight billion barrels of crude oil and
natural gas' 39 that will require roughly $600 billion in capital invest-
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Ana Nicolaci da Costa, Foreign Investment in Brazil to Fall in 2009, REUTERS, Dec. 18,
2008, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/marketsNewsUS/idINN1838587020081218.
135. See generally Chazan & Prada supra note 99.
136. C.I.A. Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.
html (last visited Apr. 25, 2010)
137. Press Release, Office of the Spokesman U.S Department of State, Advancing Coopera-
tion on Biofuels with Brazil (Mar. 9, 2007), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2007/mar/81589.htm.
138. Id.
139. Barrionuevo, supra note 19.
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ment, 140 and the recent announcement that China will loan Brazil a
great deal of that capital to develop the field, 1 4 1 the loss of potential
U.S. investment is obvious. This loss of investment is further com-
pounded by the fact that U.S. "global exports declined 12 percent in
[the last year], the biggest contraction since World War II."142 U.S.
reluctance to enhance its reciprocal trade relationship with Brazil has
contributed to Brazil's desire to look elsewhere for foreign invest-
ment. Strengthening U.S./Brazilian trade relations by allowing Brazil-
ian ethanol access to U.S. markets could go a long way towards
providing Brazil with incentive to pursue U.S. foreign investment
which would subsequently stimulate the U.S. economy.
B. Liberalized Trade between the U.S. and Brazil and
Geopolitical Influence
In an increasingly globalized world, economic relations play a criti-
cal role in establishing and developing geopolitical influence.
America's trade relationship with Brazil is a crucial modern example
of this. Although the U.S.'s international image has rebounded with
the election of President Obama, the war in Iraq has taken a heavy
toll on U.S. geopolitical influence. A 2006 survey published by The
Financial Times revealed that 36 percent of Europeans considered the
U.S. the "principle threat to world stability, ahead of Iran (30 percent)
and China (18 percent)." 143 The 2007 Pew Research Center's release
of a forty-five thousand person, seven country survey, demonstrated
for the fifth year in a row that the U.S. lost international prestige.144
The current global economic collapse has only further damaged the
U.S.'s international image with many around the world blaming the
U.S. for the crisis. 145 All this paints a very different picture from the
traditional image of the U.S. as world leader and protector. As world
opposition to the U.S. mounts, the world's emerging markets have be-
come increasingly less dependent on the U.S. economically and politi-
cally. Allowing Brazilian ethanol penetration into the U.S. market
could demonstrate a new approach by a new government that could
140. Tom Bergin, Brazil Oil Find Means Major Capital Investment-UBS, REUTERS, May 8,
2008, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idlNLO856636720080508.
141. China Will Finance Brazil's Deep Sea Oil Extraction, BRAZZIL MAG., Feb. 20, 2009 avail-
able at http://www.brazzilmag.com/content/view/10579/ [hereinafter BRAZZIL MAG].
142. Sewell Chan, U.S. Nears a Crossroads on Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at B3.
143. COHEN-TANUGI, supra note 4, at 34.
144. Id. at 33.
145. Brain Katulis, Economic Crisis Hits an Already Damaged U.S. Image in the Middle East,
TPM CAFEt (Mar. 18, 2009), available at http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/03/18/eco-
nomic-crisishitsan-already-damaged-us-image i/.
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begin to change the U.S.'s rapidly deteriorating image and geopolitical
influence.
A strengthened U.S. policy of engagement with Brazil in terms of
trade is a critical step in restoring U.S. global economic and geopoliti-
cal influence. As Harvard's Robert Z. Lawrence recently noted, "[i]f
you're serious, as the Obama administration is, about being a leader in
the multinational system, you can't not provide leadership in the inter-
national trade arena." 146 Changing the U.S. stance on Brazilian etha-
nol tariffs and domestic corn ethanol subsidies would send a strong
signal to Brazil and the rest of the world about the U.S.'s beliefs about
the resiliency of its economy, the ingenuity of its domestic production
base, and its relationship with the global marketplace. A changed
trade agreement would likely bring the U.S. long term economic
gains, but it could also have immediate economic effects. The 2009
WTO decision against the U.S. in favor of Brazil regarding cotton sub-
sidies 47 gave Brazil the ability to exercise1 48 "retaliatory measures,
which could total $591 million." Thus far, Brazil has not commenced
with such tactics. A change in U.S. policy would go a long way to-
wards incentivizing Brazil not to pursue those measures, and would go
a long way towards demonstrating a U.S. commitment to strengthen-
ing ties with all emerging markets including those that share much
different political structures and ideologies than the U.S. and Brazil.
As it stands, Brazil's continued development of trade agreements with
countries other than the U.S., put Brazil in a position to likely be
more influenced economically and politically by those countries than
by the U.S.
Brazil's economic and geopolitical development jeopardizes its
democratic culture by aligning itself too closely with traditionally
weak non-democratic countries. Brazil's long awaited economic take-
off has helped substantiate President Lula's efforts to put Brazilians to
work in record numbers. However, the same mechanisms that have
driven the increased job market and domestic growth have established
interdependent trade relations with the foreign markets of China,
Russia, and Iran,149 as well as Columbia, Venezuela, and Cuba.
China's massive energy demand alone has produced a huge transfer of
146. Chan, supra note 141.
147. WTO Dispute DS267, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop~e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds267-e.htm.
148. Chan, supra note 141.
149. See Alexei Barrionuevo, Obama Writes to Brazil's Leader about Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
24, 2009, at A6; Brazil Rebuffs US Pressure for Iran Sanctions, BBC News, Mar. 3, 2010 http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil8547150.stm (both discussing the increasing U.S. concerns over the develop-
ing relationship between Brazil and Iran).
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wealth into Brazil.150 Brazil's recent agreement to supply China with
100,000 to 160,000 barrels of oil per day in exchange for a loan to pay
for Brazil's offshore oil development' 5' represents a long-term rela-
tionship between the two countries. Brazil's desire to secure non-
Western and non-International Bank funding for its development cor-
relates with China's need to secure energy sources for its rapidly ex-
panding domestic market. Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim
hailed the agreement as evidence of the strong economic and political
ties between the two countries, describing it as "the most important
South-South relationship." 152 This relationship creates "opportunistic
diplomacy, often opposed to Western policies, values, and inter-
ests."153 Brazil's economic dependence on a country like China,
which has a poor democratic track record, and a country like Iran
which has obvious anti-American sentiment, presents practical
problems in terms of geopolitical influence and complicity.
The strengthening of democratic practices and institutions in Latin
America depends on further development of international relations
with democratic countries like the U.S. The lessening of U.S. geopo-
litical influence in the region has corresponded to the strengthening
favor for non-democratic principles and countries. Venezuelan Presi-
dent Hugo Chavez nationalized the country's oil, telephone and elec-
tric companies. 154 Bolivian President Evo Morales took control of the
country's natural gas reserves. 55 Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa
won a referendum that substantially elevates his control over the
country's economy.156 David Rothkopf, the Clinton Administration's
head of the International Trade Administration, contends that all
these actions are partially justified within the region by pointing to
U.S. economic failure and U.S. government intervention in its econ-
omy.'57 All this represents a trend in the region that runs counter to
American interests. Strengthening a relationship with Brazil and
President Lula whom President Obama recently called "the most pop-
150. COHEN-TANUGI, supra note 4, at 22-23 (arguing that China's need for oil has propelled
Latin American source countries towards a "economic nationalism" that threatens to undermine
Western, in particular, American influence in the region).
151. BRAZZIL MAG, supra note 144.
152. Id.
153. COHEN-TANUGI, supra note 4, at 66.
154. Tom Gjelten, South America Watches as U.S. Alters Free Market Tune, ALL THINGS CON-
SIDERED, Sept. 30, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=95550170.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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ular politician on the earth," 58 is essential if the U.S. desires to stem
the tide of leftist revival and strengthen its geopolitical influence in
the region. Allowing Brazilian ethanol in to the U.S. market would
represent a new perspective that would send a message about the
U.S.'s commitment not only to its relationship with Brazil, but with
the region as a whole.
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. should foster a policy of engagement with Brazil by meet-
ing their demands for liberalized trade through reductions in Ameri-
can farm subsidies and tariffs on Brazilian ethanol. Doing so would
provide the U.S. with the opportunity to improve its domestic econ-
omy and its international position. The current economic crisis threat-
ens not only the U.S.'s domestic economy, but also its international
position. The recent 2009 London G20 pact and the protests that ac-
companied it reflect deeply rooted differences about economic poli-
cies and the need for new approaches. The continuing wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and the ongoing political instability in the greater
Middle East speak to the dangers that derive from relationships with
the oil-rich countries abroad. The ongoing oil leak in the Gulf of
Mexico reiterates the perils associated with off shore drilling and do-
mestic oil production. The U.S. finds itself amidst a radically new
playing field threatened domestically by problems created by the pre-
vious administration and internationally by the emergence of new
markets and new ideologies. It is essential that the U.S. respond with
an innovative approach to the crisis that combines both domestic eco-
nomic reinvigoration and development of U.S. international geopoliti-
cal relations. Allowing Brazilian ethanol to penetrate the U.S. market
without the constraints of tariffs or domestic subsidies would re-
present a concerted effort to do both. Removing these barriers would
eliminate dependence on foreign oil from countries without stable
democratic systems while simultaneously providing support for the
overall development of Latin American democratic principles. Addi-
tionally, this would stimulate the U.S. domestic economy by creating
jobs, increasing domestic competition for alternative and renewable
fuel sources, revitalizing the American farm system, and providing op-
portunities for increased American investment in Brazil. Finally,
strengthening its relationship with Brazil would strengthen the U.S.'s
geopolitical position with the rest of the world. By fostering a further
158. Jake Tapper, The Significance of President Obama Praising Lula's "Good Looks,"
ABCNEWS.COM, Apr. 2, 2009, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/04/thats-my-man-
ri.html.
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developed relationship with Brazil, the largest, wealthiest, and most
influential South American country, through liberalization of Brazil-
ian ethanol trade, the U.S. can help stabilize the Western Hemi-
sphere's economy and the U.S.'s position within it as a primary global
influence.

